In this paper we analyze judgement aggregation problems in which a group of agents independently votes on a set of complex propositions that has some interdependency constraint between them (e.g., transitivity when describing preferences). We consider the issue of judgement aggregation from the perspective of approximation. That is, we generalize the previous results by studying approximate judgement aggregation. We relax the main two constraints assumed in the current literature, Consistency and Independence and consider mechanisms that only approximately satisfy these constraints, that is, satisfy them up to a small portion of the inputs. The main question we raise is whether the relaxation of these notions significantly alters the class of satisfying aggregation mechanisms. The recent works for preference aggregation of Kalai, Mossel, and Keller fit into this framework. The main result of this paper is that, as in the case of preference aggregation, in the case of a subclass of a natural class of aggregation problems termed 'truthfunctional agendas', the set of satisfying aggregation mechanisms does not extend non-trivially when relaxing the constraints. Our proof techniques involve boolean Fourier transform and analysis of voter influences for voting protocols. The question we raise for Approximate Aggregation can be stated in terms of Property Testing. For instance, as a corollary from our result we get a generalization of the classic result for property testing of linearity of boolean functions.
Introduction
A famous jury paradox shows that aggregating complex decisions might be nontrivial. Assume a jury is faced with a case in which a defendant is accused of murder. The legal doctrine (known by all of them) is that the defendant should be convicted if and only if they are convinced that a)The defendant indeed killed the victim and b)The defendant is sane. We assume that each of the jurors decides his opinion on the two issues independently and based on this decides whether to convict. Then, the members cast their votes simultaneously and we assume no strategic behavior on their behalf. Kornhauser and Sager [19] noticed that it's possible to have an opinion profile in which, when applying issue-wise aggregation using majority, which seems natural, we get a discrepancy between the majority vote on the conviction question and the conjunction of the majority vote on the two basic questions(whether the defendant killed and whether he is sane)
1 . This discrepancy is termed The Doctrinal Paradox. Lately, in [21] , List showed that the probability to get such a discrepancy is non-negligible under the uniform distribution and also under other mild relaxations of it (still assuming the voters are i.i.d.).
This insight, that is common to many aggregation problems (e.g., Condorcet paradox for preference aggregation), started the field of 'Judgement Aggregation' and nowadays this field is the subject of a growing body of works in economics, computer science, political science, philosophy, law, and other related disciplines. We find this field highly applicable to agent systems, voting protocols in a network and other frameworks in which one needs to aggregate a lot of opinions in a systematic way without letting the voters deliberate. An aggregation problem in our context concerns a given Agenda, which is a set of {0, 1} vectors of length m (the number of issues), that defines the consistent (legal/rational/admissible) opinions that an individual might hold. Given an agenda, Aggregation Theory deals with exploring ways to aggregate opinions of (often many) experts/judges while maintaining two main syntactical properties: -Consistency -always returning an admissible opinion.
In our example, the aggregated opinion should be to convict iff the aggregated opinion was that indeed the defendant killed and is sane. -Independence -define the aggregated opinion on each issue independently of the votes on other issues. This criterion can be seen as respecting the structure of the agenda instead of handling it as a set of several different opinions (in the example above, four) disregarding the structure.
Most of these works(e.g., [28, 9] ) find the set of 'acceptable' aggregation mechanisms (i.e., that satisfy the two criteria) to be very small and undesired (e.g., 1 For instance, the following profile: Killed Sane Guilty 25% of the jurors: 33% of the jurors: × × 42% of the jurors: × × dictatorships) and hence are considered as impossibility results. A survey of this field can be found in [24, 22] . Such impossibility results are quite strong, they show the impossibility of finding any reasonable aggregation mechanism that satisfies the two conditions and hence for (almost) every mechanism there will always be some judgement profile that leads to a breakdown of the mechanism. In this work we extend the question to 'Approximate Judgement Aggregation'. We relax the above two properties and search for an aggregation mechanism that only approximately respects the structure of opinions and up to a small fraction of the inputs returns a consistent opinion. More specifically, we are interested in exploring the influence of relaxing the two properties on the set of 'acceptable' aggregation mechanisms.
We quantify being almost consistent by defining δ-consistency of an aggregation mechanism F as having a consistent aggregation mechanism G that disagrees with F on at most δ fraction of the inputs 2 . Similarly, we quantify being almost independent by defining δ-independence of an aggregation mechanism F as having an independent aggregation mechanism that disagrees with F on at most δ fraction of the inputs. Both terms can be equivalently defined as the failure probability of tests as we show in Section 2. Both definitions use the Hamming distance between mechanisms
. It includes two assumptions: uniform distribution over the opinions for each voter and assuming voters draw their opinions independently (Impartial Culture Assumption). These assumptions, while certainly unrealistic, are the natural choice in this kind of work and are discussed further in Section 2.
Lately there is a series of works coping with impossibility results in Social Choice Theory using approximations (e.g., [5, 14] ). In some cases allowing approximation enables significantly better results, while in other cases, hardly anything is gained by allowing it. For example, in [5] the authors deal with preference aggregation and show that when one approximates Dodgson's scoring rule one can achieve several desired properties (monotonicity, homogeneity, and low complexity) that cannot be achieved without this relaxation. On the other hand, in [14] the authors also deal with aggregation of preferences and show that relaxing the strategy-proofness property does not extend the set of satisfying aggregation mechanisms non-trivially and by that they strengthen the classic impossibility result of Gibbard & Satterthwaite. In this work we formalize (as far as we found for the first time) this question of quantifying the influence of relaxing the constraints and query whether one can use this in order to circumvent the impossibility results (as in [5] ) or whether we strengthen the impossibility results (as in [14] ).
In this paper we study a family of agendas: truth-functional agendas in which each conclusion is defined as conjunction or xor of several premises (up to input & output negation). In a truth-functional agenda the issues are divided into two types: premises and conclusions. Each conclusion j is characterized by a boolean function Φ j over the premises and an opinion is consistent if the answers to the conclusion issues are attained by applying the function Φ j on the answers to the premise issues.
X = x ∈ {0, 1} m x j = Φ j (premises) for every conclusion issue j.
For instance the (2-premises) conjunction agenda used in the example above is a truth-functional agenda with two premises and one conclusion and we notate the agenda by A, B, A ∧ B .
For all the agendas we examined, we show that relaxing the two constraints, consistency and independence, does not extend the set of acceptable aggregation mechanisms in a non-trivial way.
We concentrated on two basic agendas: Conjunction Agenda
, m + 1 issues where the consistency means that the last one should be a conjunction of the first m) and Xor Agenda
, m + 1 issues where the consistency means that the last one should be a parity bit of the first m). For these agendas we prove Theorem.
1. For any m 2, > 0, and n 2, there exists δ( , n, m) polynomial in n and (but degrades exponentially in m) s.t. if an aggregation mechanism F over n voters for the m-premises conjunction agenda is δ-independent 3 and δ-consistent 4 , then it is -close to a consistent independent aggregation mechanism G 5 . Moreover, δ = C n 8m 2m−1 (for some constant C > 0), 2. For any m 2, > 0, and n 2, there exists δ( , m) linear in (and degrades quadratically in m) s.t. if an aggregation mechanism F over n voters for the m-premises xor agenda is δ-independent 3 and δ-consistent 4 , then it is -close to a consistent independent aggregation mechanism G 5 . Moreover, δ = m(2m+3) Hence, the above theorem can be seen as an impossibility result saying that it is impossible even to find a mechanism that is almost consistent and almost independent besides the trivial answers: independent consistent mechanism and perturbations of them which is (still) a relatively small and undesired collection of mechanisms.
Our results are invariant to negation of issues (which is merely renaming), and hence we can easily generalize the results to other agendas such as
and
Using induction we can generalize the result to more complex agendas that include several conclusion issues such as
The general formulation of the theorem can be in the long version of this paper [33] . We notice that this generalize our result to any agenda of the form
for any function Φ 6 and to any affine agenda (I.e., the set of admissible opinions form an affine space).
Previous works
There is a long line of works trying to circumvent impossibility results in Aggregation Theory (i.e., results which state that the set of consistent independent aggregation mechanisms is very small and undesired). Most of these works suggest consistent aggregating mechanisms while still trying to stay 'reasonably close' to independence (E.g., [19, 18, 29, 23, 7, 4, 20, 8, 30] ). These classical works are heuristic, sometimes uses the semantics of the agenda, and mainly do not prove bounds on the compliance to the independence property. In [21] , List studies the asymptotic probability of getting an inconsistent result in the 2-premises conjunction agenda A, B, A ∧ B for voter-independent distributions and common (majority-based & supermajority-based) aggregation mechanisms. He mainly studies the conditions for the probability to converge to zero and to one. As far as we found, this is the only work that deals with quantifying, although only asymptotically, the property compliance of an aggregation mechanism for agendas other than the Arovian agenda (preference aggregation).
Another approach is Approximate Aggregation. This line of research started with [15] and was extended in [26, 16] . In these works the authors deal with preference aggregation (although without stating the general framework of approximate aggregation) and show that relaxing the transitivity constraint (which is equivalent to consistency for this agenda) does not extend the set of satisfying aggregation mechanisms non-trivially.
Theorem ([16] Theorem 1.3).
There exists an absolute constant C such that the following holds: For any > 0 and k 3, if f is an aggregation mechanism for the preference agenda over k candidates that satisfies independence and C · /k 2 3 -consistency, then there exists an aggregation mechanism G that satisfies independence and consistency such that d(F, G) < .
This result is neither derived by our results nor derives them because the agendas we deal with and the preference agenda are too different (For instance, the preference agenda cannot be represented as a truth-functional agenda and in some sense it is even far from it).
Connection to Property Testing
We think it might be useful to phrase the question of approximate aggregation using terminology of property testing. In this field we query a function at a small number of (random) points, testing for a global property (in our case, the property is being a consistent independent aggregation mechanism). For example, a corollary of the results we present in this paper (in property testing terms):
For any three binary functions f, g, h : {0, 1} n → {0, 1}, if the probability Pr [f (x) ⊕ g(y) = h(x ⊕ y)] is larger than (1− ) (when the addition is in Z 2 and Z n 2 , respectively), then there exists three binary functions f , g , h : {0,
Techniques
We prove the main theorem by proving the specific case of independent aggregation mechanism for two basic agenda families: the conjunction agendas and the xor agendas. Later we extend these theorems to the general theorem of relaxing both constraints in a agenda-independent way.
We use two different techniques in the proofs. For the conjunction agendas we study influence measures of voters on the issue-aggregating functions 7 . and for the xor agendas we use Fourier analysis of the issue-aggregating functions.
An open question is whether one can find such bounds for any agenda or whether there exists an agenda for which the class of aggregation mechanisms that satisfy consistency and independence expands non trivially when we relax the consistency and independence constraints.
We proceed to describe the structure of the paper. In Section 2 we describe the formal model of aggregation mechanisms. In Section 3 we present the main agendas we deal with, truth-functional agendas, and specifically conjunction agendas and xor agendas. In Section 4 we state the motivation to deal with approximate aggregation. Section 5 concludes.
The Model
We define the model similarly to [9, 10] (which is Rubinstein and Fishburn's model [32] for the boolean case).
We consider a committee of n individuals that needs to decide on m boolean issues 8 . An opinion is a vector x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x m ) ∈ {0, 1} m denoting an answer to each of the issues. An opinion profile is a matrix X ∈ ({0, 1} m ) n denoting the opinions of the committee members, so an entry X j i denotes the vote of the i th voter for the j th issue. In addition we assume that an agenda X ⊆ {0, 1} m of the consistent opinions is given. The basic notion in this field is Aggregation Mechanism which is a function that returns an aggregated opinion (not necessarily consistent) for every profile 9 :
m . An aggregation mechanism satisfies Independence (and we say that the mechanism is independent) if for any two consistent profiles X and Y and an issue j, if X j = Y j (all individuals voted the same on the j th issue in both profiles) then (F (X)) j = (F (Y )) j (the aggregated opinion for the j th issue is the same for both profiles). This means that F satisfies independence if one can find m boolean functions
10 . An independent aggregation mechanism satisfies systematicity if all issues are aggregated using the same function, i.e., F (X) = f (X 1 ), . . . , f (X m ) for some issue aggregating function f . We will use the notation f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f m for the independent aggregation mechanism that aggregates the j th issue using f j . The main two measures we study in this paper are the inconsistency index IC X (F ) and the dependency index DI X (F ) of a given aggregation mechanism F and a given agenda X. These measures are relaxations of the consistency and independence criterion that are usually assumed in current works 11 . We define the measures in the following way:
Definition 1 (Inconsistency Index).
For an agenda X and an aggregation mechanism F for that agenda, the inconsistency index is defined to be the probability to get an inconsistent result.
Definition 2 (Dependency Index 13 ). For an agenda X and an aggregation mechanism F for that agenda, the dependency vector DI j,X (F ) is defined as
The dependency index DI X (F ) is defined by: DI X (F ) = max j=1,...,m DI j,X (F ) 9 We define the function for all profiles for simplicity but we are not interested in the aggregated opinion in cases one of the voters voted an inconsistent opinion. 10 Notice this property is a generalization of the IIA property for social welfare functions (aggregation mechanism for the preference agenda) so a social welfare function satisfies IIA iff it satisfies independence as defined here (when the issues are the pair-wise comparisons). 11 F satisfies consistency iff IC(F ) = 0 and independence iff DI(F ) = 0 12 In [21] List presented this measure under the name 'Probability of a collective inconsistency' and studies its asymptotical behavior for the conjunction agenda and the issue-wise majority aggregation mechanism. In contexts where the agenda is clear we omit the agenda superscript and notate these as IC(F ), DI j (F ), and DI(F ), respectively. We define these two indices using local tests and prove that the more natural definition of distance to the class of aggregation mechanisms that satisfy consistency (or independence) is equivalent to the above (up to multiplication by a constant). These definitions include two major assumptions on the opinion profile distribution. First, we assume the voters pick their opinions independently and from the same distribution. Second, we assume a uniform distribution over the (consistent) opinions for each voter (Impartial Culture Assumption). The uniform distribution assumption, while certainly unrealistic, is the natural choice for proving 'lower bounds' on IC(F ). That is, proving results of the format 'Every aggregation mechanism of a given class has inconsistency index of at least γ(n)'. In particular, the lower bound, up to a factor δ, applies also to any distribution that gives each preference profile at least a δ fraction of the probability given by the uniform distribution 14 . Note that we cannot hope to get a reasonable bound result for every distribution. For instance, since for every aggregation mechanism we can take a distribution on profiles for which it returns a consistent opinion.
Binary Functions
Throughout this paper we will identify True with 1 and False with 0 and use logical operators on bits and bit vectors (using entry-wise semantics).
We define the following measures for the influence of an individual or a coalition of individuals on a function f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1}. Both definitions use the uniform distribution over {0, 1} n (which is consistent with the assumption we have on the profile distribution).
-The Influence 15 of a voter i on f is defined to be the probability that he can change the result by changing his vote.
(x⊕e i = adding to x, e i (the i th elementary vector)=flipping the i th bit 0 ↔ 1) -The (zero-)Ignorability of a coalition S ⊆ {1, . . . , n} is is defined to be the probability that f returns 1 when one of the members of S voted 0.
In addition we define a distance function over the binary functions. The distance between two functions f, g : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} is defined to be the probability of getting a different result (normalized Hamming distance).
. From this measure we will derive a distance from a function to a set of functions by d(f, G) = min g∈G d(f, g) 14 In successive works we relax this assumption and prove similar results for more general distributions. 15 In the simple cooperative games regime, this is also called the Banzhaf power index of player i in the game f .
A lot of natural problems can be formulated in the framework of aggregation mechanisms. It is natural to divide the agendas into two major classes TruthFunctional Agendas and Non Truth-Functional Agendas.
Truth-Functional Agendas
A (k-premise) truth-functional agenda is defined by a conclusions function (Φ : {0, 1} k → {0, 1} m−k ) from the k premises to the (m − k) conclusions. An opinion is consistent if the answers to the conclusion issues are attained by applying Φ on the answers to the premise issues.
These agendas, due to their structure, seem to be a good point to start our work on approximate aggregation and in this paper we prove results for two families of truth-functional agendas. Later we derive results for a more general family of truth-functional agendas. there are m + 1 issues to decide on and the consistency criterion is defined to be that the last issue is True if the number of true-valued opinions for the first m is even. An equivalent way to define this agenda is constraining the number of True answers to be odd.
Non Truth-Functional Agendas
One can think on a lot of agendas that cannot be represented as a truthfunctional agenda. Among such interesting natural agendas that were studied one can find the equivalence agenda [13] , the membership agenda [31] [25] , and the preference agenda described below. Preference Aggregation: Aggregation of preferences is one of the oldest aggregation frameworks studied. In this framework there are s candidates and each individual holds a full strict order over them. We are interested in Social Welfare Functions which are functions that aggregate n such orders to an aggregated order. As seen in [27, 6] , this problem can be stated naturally in the aggregation framework we defined by defining s 2 issues 16 .
Motivation
We find the motivation for dealing with the field of approximate judgement aggregation in three different disciplines.
-The consistent characterization are often regarded as 'impossibility results' in the sense that they 'permit' a very restrictive set of aggregation mechanisms. (e.g., Arrow's theorem tells us that there is no 'reasonable' way to aggregate preferences). Extending these theorems to approximate aggregation characterizations sheds light on these impossibility results by relaxing the constraints. -The questions of Aggregation Theory have often roots in Philosophy, Law, and Political Science. There is a long line of works suggesting consistent aggregating mechanisms while still trying to stay 'reasonably close' to independence. The main general (not agenda-tailored) suggestions are premise-based mechanisms and conclusion-based aggregation for truth-functional agendas (see, among others, [19, 18, 29, 23, 7, 4] ), and a generalization of them to nontruth-functional agendas called sequential priority aggregation( [20, 8] ). Another procedure in the literature is the distance-based aggregation( [30] ) which is well known for preference aggregation (E.g., Kemeny voting rule [17] , Dodgson voting rule [2] , and lately a more systematic analysis in [12] ). Our work contribute to this discussion by pointing out where one should search for solutions while not leaving the consistency and independence constraints entirely. -Connections to the Property Testing field. Due to the space constraint it is discussed in the in the long version of this paper [33] .
Summary and Future Work
In this paper we defined the question of approximate aggregation which is a generalization of the study of aggregation mechanisms that satisfy consistency and independence. We defined measures for the relaxation of the consistency constraint (inconsistency index IC) and for the relaxation of the independence constraint (dependency index DI). To our knowledge, this is the first time this question is stated in its general form. We proved that relaxing these constraints does not extend the set of satisfying aggregation mechanisms in a non-trivial way for any truth-functional agenda in which every conclusion is either conjunction or xor up to negation of inputs or output. We notice that every conclusion of two premises can be stated as such as well as any affine agenda. Particulary we calculated the dependency between the extension of this class ( ) and the inconsistency index (δ( )) (although probably not strictly) for two families of truth-functional agendas with one conclusion. The relation we proved includes dependency on the number of voters (n). In similar works for preference agendas [15, 26, 16 ] the relation did not include such a dependency. An interesting question is whether such a dependency is inherent for conjunction agendas or whether it is possible to prove a relation that does not include it.
A major assumption in this paper is the uniform distribution over the inputs which is equivalent to assuming i.i.d uniform distribution over the premises. We think that our results can be extended for other distributions (still assuming voters' opinions are distributed i.i.d) over the space over premises' opinions which seem more realistic.
Immediate extensions for this work can be to extend our result to more complex truth-functional agendas and generalize our results to non-truth-functional agendas to get a result unifying our work and Kalai, Mossel, and Keller's works for the preference agenda.
A major open question is whether one can find an agenda for which relaxing the constraints of independence and consistency extends the class of satisfying aggregation mechanisms in a non-trivial way.
